

## Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 305137

FOR AMB YOUNG FROM UNA

FOLLOWING REPEAT CAIRO 22384 ACTION STATE KHARTOUM INFO ADDIS  
ABABA DJIBOUTI MOGADISCIO DEC 21.

QUOTE C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 22384

CODEL TSONGAS/BONKER

DEPARTMENT FOR H

KHARTOUM FOR REP. BONKER

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OREP (TSONGAS, PAUL AND BONKER DON)

SUBJECT: CODEL TSONGAS/BONKER: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT

- SADAT

1. AT 1100 MONDAY, DEC 19, REPS TSONGAS AND BONKER MET  
WITH PRESIDENT SADAT TO DISCUSS CURRENT SITUATION IN HORN  
OF AFRICA. MR. BRUCE VAN VOORST, OF SENATOR CLARK'S STAFF  
WAS ALSO PRESENT. FOLLOWING IS A MEMORANDUM OF THEIR  
CONVERSATION.  
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2. AFTER WARM EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS, PRESIDENT SADAT SAID  
HE WAS DEPARTING FOR ISMAILIA TO MEET WITH ISRAELI PM  
BEGIN. NO TIME HAD YET BEEN SET FOR THE MEETING,  
HOWEVER.

3. REP BONKER COMMENTED THAT HE AND REP TSONGAS HAD BEEN  
TRAVELLING THROUGH HORN OF AFRICA, STUDYING ISSUES  
PERTINENT TO THAT REGION, BUT WANTED SADAT TO  
KNOW OF TREMENDOUS SUPPORT FOR HIS PEACE INITIATIVES IN  
U.S. PUBLIC OPINION IS VIEWING HIM AS A GREAT STATESMAN

AND HAS DEVELOPED REVERENCE AND AFFECTION FOR HIM AND MRS. SADAT. REP TSONGAS NOTED THAT IN MEETING WITH HIS OWN SUPPORTERS ON LEAVING FOR PRESENT TOUR, HIS ANNOUNCEMENT THAT HE WOULD MEET WITH PRESIDENT SADAT HAD BEEN RECEIVED WITH WARM APPLAUSE.

4. SADAT VOICED HOPE THAT PEACE COULD BE ESTABLISHED IN REGION ONCE AND FOR ALL. HE HAD ALREADY SAID THAT BARRIER OF DISTRUST AND BITTERNESS WAS 70 PERCENT OF PROBLEM AND SUBSTANCE 30 PERCENT. HE BELIEVED HIS VISIT TO JERUSALEM HAD BROKEN THROUGH BITTERNESS, HATRED AND MISTRUST AND THAT REGION WAS HEADING TOWARDS NEW ERA. REP BONKER NOTED REMARKABLE CHANGE OF HEART TOWARDS EGYPT IN ISRAEL. SADAT SAID HE HAD OBSERVED CHANGING ATMOSPHERE AND WAS AWARE THAT ISRAELI CITIZENS SUPPORT PEACE DIALOGUE. REPRESENTATIVES AFFIRMED U.S. SUPPORT FOR SADAT'S EFFORTS AND REP BONKER NOTED SADAT HAD HAD PROBLEMS AS RESULT, NOTABLY WITH CERTAIN ARAB STATES. NEVERTHELESS, BELIEVED PRESIDENT HAS TRUE LEADERSHIP QUALITY, REMINISCENT OF U.S. PRESIDENTS SUCH AS ABRAHAM LINCOLN WHO HAD VISION, MORAL COURAGE AND CONFIDENCE TO DO RIGHT THING. EXPRESSED BELIEF THAT SADAT WOULD PREVAIL AND HISTORY WOULD RECORD  
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FACT.

5. REP BONKER RECALLED THAT LAST TIME SADAT HAD BEEN IN U.S. AND MET WITH FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE HE HAD ADDRESSED ALL OF HIS REMARKS TO SITUATION IN AFRICA. AT THAT TIME, CONGRESSMAN HAD ASKED HIMSELF WHY BUT NOW, AFTER WEEK IN HORN, HE WAS ABLE TO CONFIRM THAT PRESIDENT INDEED HAD REASON TO BE CONCERNED. SADAT RESPONDED HIS FEARS FOR SITUATION IN HORN, OF WHICH HE HAD TOLD CONGRESSMEN IN APRIL, HAD DEVELOPED AS HE HAD PREDICTED.

6. REP TSONGAS NOTED CONGRESSMEN HAD SPENT FIVE DAYS IN ADDIS ABABA. THEY HAD MET WITH MENGISTU AND ASKED WHETHER ETHIOPIA WOULD ATTEMPT TO CUT CROSS NORTHERN SOMALIA TO HARGEISA AND BERBERA. CONGRESSMEN WERE CONCERNED, AND INTENDED TO MEET WITH CONGRESS AND PRESIDENT ON U.S. POLICY IN HORN. REP TSONGAS OBSERVED DISTURBING CHANGE WITHIN ETHIOPIA. FEAR, VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM NOW PREVAILED. CONGRESS HAS NO HORN POLICY AT THIS TIME. HE AND REP BONKER HOPED TO PROVIDE SOME LEADERSHIP ON THE QUESTION.

7. SADAT REPEATED HE HAD PREDICTED SITUATION WOULD DETERIORATE 7-8 MONTHS AGO. HE HAD RAISED MATTER IN JERUSALEM WITH BEGIN WHO HAD INFORMED HIM THAT MANY RUSSIAN GENERALS WERE IN ETHIOPIA SUPPORTING MENGISTU. SADAT BELIEVED DEEPER U.S. UNDERSTANDING OF SOVIET IN-

TENTIONS WAS NECESSARY. HE HAD SOME MONTHS AGO RECEIVED ULTIMATUM FROM BREZHNEV IN WHICH SOVIETS STATED THEY WOULD CONTINUE PURSUING THEIR POLICY IN AFRICA, SUPPORT ETHIOPIA TOTALLY AND EGYPTIANS MUST ADJUST TO FACT. SIAD BARRE RECENTLY HAD TOLD SADAT OF HIS FEAR THAT ETHIOPIA WOULD SEEK TO BREAK THROUGH IN NORTH AND HAD GIVEN EGYPT CARTE BLANCHE TO ASSUME DEFENSE OF BERBERA. PLEADED WITH SADAT TO SEND FORCES. SADAT  
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CONTINUED THAT U.S. HAD NO POLICY IN HORN OR, INDEED, IN AFRICA. THIS HAD BEEN HIS MOTIVE IN ADDRESSING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE.

8. HE HAD ALSO TOLD PRESIDENT CARTER OF SIAD'S REQUEST FOR EGYPTIAN ASSISTANCE IN DEFENSE OF BERBERA. SADAT EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THAT HE COULD DO NOTHING UNLESS ASSURED OF U.S. HELP. HE HAD MADE CLEAR TO SIAD THAT HE WOULD NOT JOIN IN THE FIGHTING IN OGADEN, BUT WAS DEEPLY CONCERNED WITH FUTURE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF SOMALIA. SADAT PLEADED THAT U.S. NOT TO GIVE SOVIETS OPPORTUNITY TO RETURN TO SOMALIA BY FORCE. RECALLED THAT HE HAD NEVER ASKED FOR U.S. TO SEND TROOPS, ONLY ARMS. THIS WOULD ENABLE HIM TO FACE SOVIETS IN AFRICA. THIS BATTLE WAS AMERICA'S AS MUCH AS EGYPT'S AND IT WAS EGYPT'S BECAUSE ETHIOPIA AND SUDAN CONTROL HEADWATERS OF NILE. WHAT HAPPENES THERE IS MATTER OF LIFE OR DEATH TO EGYPT. EVEN MILITARY ACTION WOULD BE JUSTIFIABLE SINCE LIFE OR DEATH OF EGYPT INVOLVED.

9. SADAT HOPED, NEVERTHELESS, THAT DIPLOMACY COULD MAKE SOME PROGRESS. EGYPT IS COORDINATING WITH SUDAN AND WITH SOMALIA ON ETHIOPIA AND ERITREAN QUESTIONS. HE IS DEEPLY CONCERNED, SADAT RESTATED, BUT HAS NOT JOINED IN BATTLE HIMSELF, ALTHOUGH HE HAS SENT 30 MILLION DOLLARS OF - AMMUNITION AND EQUIPMENT TO SOMALIA.

10. REP BONKER ENVISIONED A NATURAL ALLIANCE OF COUNTRIES SURROUNDING ETHIOPIA. SAW POSSIBILITY THAT REGIONAL EFFORTS COULD BE ENGENDERED TO CONTAIN COMMUNIST INFLUENCE. THIS MIGHT BE BETTER MEANS THAN DIRECT SOMALIA-ETHIOPIA CONFLICT.  
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11. SADAT ANSWERED THAT HE HAD LONG VOICED HIS CONCERN TO SIAD ABOUT RUSSIAN PRESENCE IN BERBERA AND TRIED PERSUADE HIM EXPELL SOVIETS. HE HAD BEEN IN FREQUENT CONTACT WITH HIM RECENTLY AND SIAD HAD DECLARED HIMSELF PREPARED TO JOIN WITH EGYPTIANS AGAINST SOVIETS IN AFRICA.

BUT SIAD WANTED AMERICAN HELP, SADAT SAID. HE KNOWS OF U.S.-EGYPTIAN CONTACTS ON HORN. SOVIETS ATTEMPTING TO USE ON SIAD SAME LEVER OF ARMS SUPPLIES THEY HAD USED AGAINST SADAT. SIAD IS NOW READY TO WORK WITH EGYPTIANS AS ARE SUDAN AND DJIBOUTI. REP TSONGAS NOTED DEEP CONCERNS HARBORED BY KENYA OVER SIAD'S INTENTIONS. SADAT REPLIED HE COULD ASSURE CONGRESSMEN THAT NOTHING WOULD HAPPEN. REP TSONGAS REJOINED SIAD HAD NEVER MADE CLEAR THAT HE WOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO TAKE PART OF KENYA AND NOTED THAT RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN KENYA AND SOMALIA ESSENTIAL. SADAT STATED FLATLY HE COULD GUARANTEE THERE WOULD BE NO SOMALI MOVE AGAINST KENYA. HE WOULD MAKE MATTERS "AWKWARD" FOR SIAD IF HE ATTEMPTED SUCH A VENTURE.

12. VAN VOORST ASKED WHETHER SIAD COULD BE PERSUADED TO MAKE PUBLIC ASSURANCES ON KENYA. IT WAS POSSIBLE TO ASK FOR SUCH ASSURANCES, SADAT REPLIED, BUT NOTED IMPORTANT POINT WAS SIAD HAD INDEED BROKEN WITH SOVIETS. SADAT REGRETTED THAT ETHIOPIA NOW RECEIVING HELP FROM BOTH SOVIETS AND U.S. THIS MADE MATTERS AWKWARD FOR SIAD WHO SEEKING U.S. HELP THROUGH EGYPT. AMBASSADOR EILTS NOTED THAT NO U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE FLOWING TO ETHIOPIA. SADAT ANSWERED HE KNEW U.S. ASSISTANCE WAS PURELY ECONOMIC, BUT IT HAD VERY IMPORTANT IMPACT.

13. REP TSONGAS NOTED THAT ADDIS ABABA IN TUMULT. SUGGESTED THAT SEIZURE OF HARGEISA AND BERBERA WOULD BE DRAMATIC VICTORY FOR MENGISTU AND GIVE HIM MORE SECURE INTERNAL POSITION. ON OTHER HAND, MENGISTU HAD TOLD CONGRESSMEN HE HAD NO INTENTIONS OF ENTERING SOMALIA AND CONFIDENTIAL

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SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO ETHIOPIA HAD SAID SAME THING. REP TSONGAS ADDED THAT MENGISTU SAID HE WANTED SIMPLY TO BE NONALIGNED, BUT WAS FORCED TO DEFEND HIS PEOPLE FROM AGGRESSION. WONDERED WHETHER ETHIOPIAN PEOPLE REALLY BACKED MENGISTU'S EFFORT TO HOLD ON TO OGADEN. REP BONKER NOTED IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR U.S. TO PROVIDE ARMS TO SOMALIA. MATTERS MIGHT CHANGE IF SOMALIA WERE INVADED BUT, IN ANY EVENT, WEAPONS WOULD HAVE NO IMMEDIATE VALUE SINCE DELIVERY AND TRAINING WOULD TAKE TIME. ASKED IF THERE WERE ANY WAY EGYPT, U.S. AND SUDAN COULD ASSIST SOMALIA. OBSERVED SUDAN EQUIPPED PRIMARILY WITH SOVIET WEAPONS AND BROACHED POSSIBILITY THAT SUDANESE COULD HELP SOMALIS TO SOME EXTENT, EASING PRESSURE ON EGYPT TO FURNISH ARMS TO SOMALIA. ACKNOWLEDGED THIS WOULD DEPEND ON U.S. COMMITMENT, IN NEXT YEAR OR TWO, TO RESUPPLY SUDAN WITH U.S. ARMS. WAS THIS AN OPTION?

14. "WE HAVE STARTED ALREADY", SADAT SAID. IN HIS LAST MEETING WITH NUMAIRY THE TWO HAD AGREED TO ASSIST IN DEFENDING BERBERA. EACH WOULD SEND ONE ARMORED BRIGADE

AND THUS COULD HOLD NORTHERN SOMALIA AGAINST ETHIOPIANS. HE HAD SENT SIAD TO DISCUSS PROPOSAL WITH NUMAIRY AND THEN WITH SAUDI KING KHALID, SINCE NUMAIRY SHORT OF FUNDS. SADAT HAD VOLUNTEERED TO SEND BRIGADE FROM PORT SAID TO BERBERA AND WARSHIP AS WELL. KING KHALID HAD AGREED TO THIS PROPOSAL AND COMMISSION HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED TO WORK OUT DETAILS. SADAT ADDED HE COULD NOT SEND BRIGADE AT PRESENT, BUT SUDANESE COULD. HE WOULD STILL SEND WARSHIP, HOWEVER, SINCE SOVIETS CONCENTRATING FORCES NEAR BERBERA IN SOCOTRA. SADAT DISMISSED VALUE OF SOCOTRA BASE TO SOVIETS SINCE IT WOULD BE "WITHIN RANGE OF EGYPTIAN GUNS." HE ADDED THAT HE WOULD NOT WANT TO CREATE DISPUTE WITH SOVIETS LIGHTLY, BUT THEY MUST REALIZE  
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THEY HAVE LEFT SOMALIA FOREVER AND CANNOT RETURN. SADAT WAS ATTEMPTING TO SAVE DJIBOUTI AND TO ISOLATE PDRY. IN FACT, SADAT SAID, THIS WAS MAIN REASON HE HAD BROKEN RELATIONS WITH PDRY AFTER TRIPOLI CONFERENCE OF REJECTIONIST STATES. HE HAD LONG BEEN LOOKING FOR WAY TO ISOLATE YEMEN, COUNTRY WIDELY DESPISED IN ARAB WORLD, AND HAD USED PRE-TEXT OF TRIPOLI CONFERENCE TO BREAK RELATIONS. PDRY WAS HELPING SOVIETS AGAINST SOMALIA. AS CONGRESSMEN COULD SEE, SADAT CONCLUDED, HE HAD ALREADY STARTED IMPLEMENTING THEIR PLAN.

15. SADAT REMARKED HE HAD NO OBJECTION TO ANY U.S. ASSISTANCE THROUGH SUDAN NOR TO ASSISTANCE BY ANYONE ELSE. U.S. ASSISTANCE OF THIS SORT WOULD ALSO HELP EGYPT AS IT FACED WEST TOWARDS CHAD AND NIGER. THESE COUNTRIES WERE UNDER ATTACK BY QADHAFI AND BOUMEDIENE. SADAT SAID HE HAD SENT TO CHAD MORE THAN 200 TONS OF MILITARY SUPPLIES AND AMMUNITION IN PAST YEAR ON U.S. C-130 AIRCRAFT. HE WAS ACTING LIKE "SUPERPOWER", SADAT QUIPPED, BUT COULD NOT AFFORD TO CONTINUE. STILL, SOVIETS CHALLENGING EGYPT AND U.S. HE HAD NO IMMEDIATE INTERESTS IN CHAD OR NIGER, BUT STRONGLY BELIEVED THEY SHOULD NOT BE UNDER THE CONTROL OF QADHAFI OR BOUMEDIENE SINCE THEY WERE "AGENTS OF USSR".

16. REP TSONGAS QUESTIONED WHETHER SIAD BARRE REGIME COULD SURVIVE IF HARGEISA AND BERBERA FELL TO ETHIOPIA. SADAT AVERRED THIS WOULD BE GRAVE BLOW AND HE COULD NOT GUARANTEE THAT SIAD COULD SURVIVE. ASKED WHETHER SOMALIA COULD HANDLE ITS DEFENSE ALONE IF IT HAD EQUIPMENT, SADAT EXPRESSED BELIEF SOMALIA WOULD STILL NEED EGYPTIAN AND SUDANESE HELP. NEVERTHELESS, SIAD BARRE HAS BETTER SOLDIERS THAN ETHIOPIA. HIS SOLDIERS "NEED ONLY RIFLES AND AMMUNITION" AND WITH VERY LITTLE ADDITIONAL HELP SOMALIA COULD PULL THROUGH. NUMAIRY DID NOT HIMSELF HAVE ENOUGH, BUT WAS PREPARED TO SEND AN ARMORED  
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BRIGADE ALTHOUGH HE MIGHT HAVE TO DO SO WITHOUT TANKS. BUT NUMAIRY READY AND CONGRESSMEN COULD TELL HIM SADAT HAD INFORMED THEM OF THIS PLAN. WHEN U.S. HELPED SUDAN IT WOULD ALSO HELP CHAD AND NIGER.

17. SADAT CONTINUED THAT EGYPTIAN POSITION ON ERITREA WAS FIRM: IT MUST HAVE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION. HE HAD ALSO SENT 200 TONS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO ERITREANS. ASKED IF INDEPENDENT ERITREA WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO REGIONAL STABILITY, SADAT SAID COUNTRY WOULD IN ANY CASE JOIN ARAB LEAGUE. ADDITONALLY, "ERITREA COULD BE CONTROLLED THROUGH SUDAN". THERE NO NEED TO FEAR INSTABILITY.

18. REP TSONGAS ASKED WHETHER, IN VIEW OF EQUALLY STRONG ETHIOPIAN AND SOMALI EMOTIONS ON OGADEN, SIAD WOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE CONCESSIONS OR EVEN RELINQUISH THE OGADEN. WHEN ETHIOPIA WAS READY, SADAT BELIEVED, COM-PROMISE COULD BE REACHED. BUT AT PRESENT, SIAD WAS FRIGHTENED SINCE SOVIETS WERE ENCOURAGING TAKEOVER OF NORTH PORTION OF SOMALIA. SIAD, HE REPEATED, WAS SCARED. REP BONKER ASKED FOR SADAT'S ESTIMATE OF WHY SOVIETS HAD DECIDED THEIR BEST INTERESTS LAY WITH ETHIOPIA RATHER THAN SOMALIA IN SPITE OF STRATEGIC VALUE OF BERBERA. SADAT CLAIMED SOVIETS WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO HOLD ON TO BOTH COUNTRIES, AND HAD BEEN ABLE TO DO SO FOR SIX MONTHS. SIAD HAD ONCE TOLD HIM IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR SOVIETS TO HAVE ONE LEG IN EACH COUNTRY THAN BOTH IN ETHIOPIA BUT CAME FINALLY TO AGREE WITH SADAT AND EXPELLED SOVIETS. SINCE RUSSIANS COULD NOT HAVE BOTH, THEY NOW WANT TO BREAK THROUGH SOMALIA TO INDIAN OCEAN, ESPECIALLY SINCE SOCOTRA BASE WOULD BE UNDER EGYPTIAN GUNS AND THEREFORE USELESS.

19. REP TSONGAS RECALLED ETHIOPIA HE HAD KNOWN AS PEACE  
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CORPS VOLUNTEER AND SAID HE WAS SHOCKED TO SEE IT SURRENDER ITS SENSE OF NATIONAL PRIDE FOR MARXIST/LENINIST IDEOLOGY. WONDERED WHETHER THIS WAS FOR SAKE OF ARMS OR SINCERE. SADAT DISMISSED MENGISTU AS COPY OF QADHAFI WHO WANTS TO STAY IN POWER AT ANY PRICE. LIKE QADHAFI, HE IS BLOODTHIRSTY AND UNSCRUPULOUS. REP BONKER REMARKED CODEL HAD SEEN RESULTS OF KILLINGS IN ADDIS ABABA. (THERE THEN FOLLOWED DESCRIPTION BY CONGRESSMEN OF SITUATION THEY HAD WITNESSED THERE.) SADAT SAID HE HAPPY CONGRESSMEN HAD SEEN FOR THEMSELVES MENGISTU WOULD GO TO ANY EXTENT TO STAY IN POWER.

20. VAN VOORST ASKED WHAT U.S. SHOULD DO ABOUT ETHIOPIA. SADAT SAID SIAD BARRE WAS CHAGRINED THAT U.S. ARMS BEING

USED AGAINST SOMALIA EVEN TODAY. HE WOULD LIKE U.S., SADAT SAID, TO DEAL WITH SOMALIA FRANKLY. U.S. SHOULD SPELL OUT ITS ATTITUDE, INSTEAD, IT IS PROVIDING ETHIOPIA AID AND F-5'S STILL ATTACK SOMALIA. ALL THIS SHOULD STOP. SIAD MUST, ABOVE ALL, BE MADE TO FEEL THAT U.S. IS BACKING HIM. WITH SOME SUPPORT, AND FEELING THAT HE IS BEING BACKED, COMPROMISE COULD BE REACHED.

21. ASKED WHY SOVIETS SHOULD LAST LONGER IN ETHIOPIA THAN SOMALIA, SADAT OBSERVED THAT THERE IS WAR BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND SOMALIA BUT ALSO INTERNAL UPHEAVAL IN ETHIOPIA. HE DID NOT BELIEVE ETHIOPIAN NATIONALISM COULD REASSERT ITSELF. TRIBAL NATURE OF COUNTRY WAS DIFFICULT ISSUE. TRIBES HAVE BEEN FEUDING SINCE REVOLUTION STARTED. VAN VOORST ASKED HOW THIS INSTABILITY COULD HELP SOVIETS AND SADAT REPLIED THAT SOVIETS THRIVED ON UNSTABLE SITUATIONS. THEY PLAYED ONE SIDE AGAINST OTHER. THEY HAD MAINTAINED NO WAR-NO PEACE SITUATION IN MIDDLE EAST FOR THAT REASON. ONLY SOVIETS HAD FAILED TO WELCOME SADAT'S PEACE INITIATIVES FOR THEY CAN SUCCEED ONLY IN ATMOSPHERE OF DISTRUST AND INSTABILITY.

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22. WHEN ASKED BY REP BONKER WHY SOVIETS SHOULD BE HATED MOST BY THOSE TO WHOM THEY WERE CLOSEST, SADAT REPLIED OBSERVATION WAS CORRECT. THOSE WHO KNEW THEM INTIMATELY FOUND THEM CLUMSY AND OVERBEARING. ADDITIONALLY, SOVIETS RELIED ON AGENTS WHO WERE GENERALLY DESPISED BY THEIR PEOPLE, AS THEY HAD BEEN IN EGYPT, AND WHO WERE INCAPABLE OF PROVIDING INFORMATION WHICH COULD BE BASIS FOR CORRECT ANALYSIS. SADAT ALSO AGREED WITH REP BONKER THAT STRENGTH OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF IN REGION AND IN AFRICA MADE IT DIFFICULT TO SELL MARXIST-LENINIST IDEOLOGY TO PEOPLE. HOWEVER, SADAT SAID, DANGER IS THAT SOVIETS COULD INSTALL THEMSELVES BY TERROR. PEOPLE IN THIS AREA, HOWEVER, WOULD NEVER TOLERATE COMMUNIST REGIME. SADAT CONCURRED IN OBSERVATION BY CONGRESSMEN THAT SOMALIA PRESENTLY VERY VULNERABLE AND ASKED U.S. "PLEASE FIND SOME WAY TO HELP." HE HAD NO OBJECTION WHETHER THIS THROUGH EGYPT OR SUDAN, BUT IMPORTANT POINT AGAIN WAS THAT SIAD BARRE MUST FEEL SECURE ON HIS OWN LAND.

23. IN CONCERT WITH U.S., SADAT SAID, MUCH COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED OR PREVENTED WITHOUT RECOURSE TO WAR. SOVIET UNION COULD BE PUT IN ITS PLACE AND ITS AIM OF CONTROLLING AFRICA, FOILED. U.S. MUST HELP AFRICAN PEOPLE FIGHT THE BATTLE.

24. ABOVE HAS NOT BEEN REVIEWED BY CONGRESSMEN, WHO DEPARTED CAIRO BEFORE DRAFTING. DEPARTMENT REQUESTED TO MAKE AVAILABLE TO CONGRESSMEN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

25. SUMMARY FOLLOWS SEPTTEL. EILTS. UNQUOTE VANCE

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